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Аннотация. Либерализация рынков 
Европейского Союза служит основой 
для классовых различий мигрантов, 
в  то  время как ограничительная им­
миграционная политика способствует 
конструированию образа определён­
Abstract. Market liberalization in the EU 
serves as a basis for class distinctions 
among migrants, while restrictive immi­
gration policies help in constructing cer­
tain immigrant culture(s) as a threat to 
homogeneity and welfare state solidarity. 
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Over the past few decades, the grounds 
for the legitimization of inequalities have 
shifted. Ascriptive traits (heterogeneities) 
have been complemented by the alleged 
cultural dispositions of immigrants and 
the conviction that immigrants as in­
dividuals are responsible for their own 
fate. Such categorizations start by dis­
tinguishing legitimate refugees from 
non­legitimate forced migrants. Another 
important issue is the alleged illiberal 
predispositions of migrants and their 
unadaptability to modernity. Politics and 
policies seem to reward specific types of 
migrants and refugees, exclude the low­ 
and non­performers in the market, and 
reward those who espouse liberal atti­
tudes. In brief, it is a process of categoriz­
ing migrants into useful or dispensable.
Keywords: welfare state, market liberal­
ization, populism, migration, inequalities
ных иммигрантских культур как угрозы 
однородности и солидарности госу­
дарства всеобщего благосостояния. 
За последние несколько десятилетий 
основания для легитимации неравен­
ства изменились. Аскриптивные черты 
(неоднородности) были дополнены пред­
полагаемыми культурными диспозиция­
ми иммигрантов и убежденностью, что 
иммигранты как отдельные лица несут 
ответственность за свою судьбу. Диф­
ференциации начинаются с отделения 
законных беженцев от нелегальных вы­
нужденных переселенцев. Другой важ­
ный вопрос —  сомнения в предраспо­
ложенности мигрантов к либеральным 
ценностям и в их приспособленности к 
жизни в современной Европе. Политика 
и политики, по­видимому, отдают предпо­
чтение определенным типам мигрантов 
и беженцев, исключают слабых и нера­
ботоспособных, вознаграждают тех, кто 
поддерживает либеральные ценности. 
Одним словом, это процесс разделения 
мигрантов на полезных и ненужных.
ключевые слова: государство все­
общего благосостояния, либерали­
зация рынка, популизм, миграция, 
неравенство
The increased perception of growing forced migration across the world, and the influx 
of migrants and asylum seekers into European welfare states have placed the impli­
cations of cross­border mobility on the political agenda once again. Once cross­border 
migrants have made it into the territory of liberal states, there is a paradox between 
efforts adhering to human rights on the one hand and those controlling the migrant 
population on the other hand. This has been called the ‘liberal paradox’ [e.g. Hollifield, 
2004]. Reinforced border controls and the externalization of control through ‘remote 
control’ of immigration countries in emigration countries —  in the case of EU member 
states in North and West Africa, for example, ensures that this liberal paradox is not 
activated, at least not to the full [Faist, 2018a].
At first sight, this insight could also apply to what I would call the ‘welfare paradox’, 
which holds that there is a tension between social rights for all citizens in national 
welfare states on the one hand and the deregulation of social and labour rights and 
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standards as part of a liberalizing global economy on the other. One may surmise that 
a decrease in immigration leads to fewer forced migrants competing with established 
non­migrants for public services and jobs. Yet the depiction of (forced) migrants as 
exploiting generous welfare states and competing in labour markets does not neces­
sarily depend on high and increasing numbers of mobile border­crossers. There is no 
empirical evidence that migrants have competed with non­migrants with respect to 
economic resources over the past three decades [Faist, 2018a].
Restrictive policies in themselves, such as trying to keep migrants from reaching the 
shores of Europe, harden the image of migrants as potential economic competitors. 
Most of the opposition to asylum­seekers in Europe nowadays comes from those au­
thoritarian political forces who openly advocate the exclusion of “others”, for example, 
right­wing populist parties. In a nutshell, the externalization of control has a clear effect 
on the liberal paradox: if migrants do not make it into the immigration countries and/
or if migrants can be expelled because their fundamental human rights can be taken 
care of someplace else (in countries of origin and transit), the state does not need to 
address politically this unwanted and unwelcomed forced migrant “surplus” popula­
tion. With respect to the welfare paradox, the effects turn out to be more ambiguous. 
More restrictive migration control will even feed the culturalization of forced migration, 
defining forced migrants as the “other” and as a threat. It also leads to portraying 
ever more categories of asylum­seekers and migrants as illegitimate refugees and 
undeserving recipients of social rights.
One may suppose that, however unintentionally, remote control contributes to the 
securitization of migration control (that is, the perception that migrants are a security 
threat, physically and to the welfare state), and —  very important —  does not necessar­
ily assuage the feelings of threat exploited so skillfully by various political parties and 
movements across Europe and North America. Moreover, as events in recent years 
seem to suggest, in extending control afar and thus minimizing the number of migrants 
arriving, the externalization strategy has not helped to convince EU member states to 
cooperate in the distribution of the initial costs of protecting refugees. Also, instead of 
living up to human rights laid down in the Geneva Refugee Convention, most European 
states have tightened restrictions on admission and declared most forced migrants as 
“economic refugees”, “bogus asylum seekers” and “illegal migrants” [Faist, 2018b].
Political Efforts to Address the Liberal Paradox
European governments have engaged in strategies of migration containment, 
based on an enhancement of the partnership between Europe and Africa and aimed 
at reducing inequalities and creating enticements for migrants to stay in their coun­
tries of origin. One of the main motivations of international organizations such as the 
World Bank, supranational entities such as the European Union (EU), national states 
or (International) Non­Governmental Organizations to sponsor economic development 
via financial remittances of migrants is to reduce the volume of cross­border migration 
from the global South to the global North, for example, from Africa to Europe. Over re­
cent years politicians across Europe have often claimed that higher levels of economic 
development (measured by per capita income and/or increased human development 
symbolized by lower infant mortality and higher rates of literacy) would eventually lead 
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to a decrease in international migration. What is more important, the emphasis of the 
EU and its Member States has been on security aspects. Their support of governments 
in Africa has led to securitization of migrants, meaning that routes through regions 
such as the Sahara have become more dangerous not only for those migrants on their 
way to Europe but also intra­African migrants. The Sahara, for example, has turned 
into a “mass graveyard” [Brachet, 2016]. This means that the routes of cross­border 
mobility, not only across the Mediterranean, have turned into humanitarian nightmares 
[cf. Cuttitta, 2017].
But even if economic development cooperation was seriously applied, there are 
doubts as to its consequences. The “inverted U­curve” suggests that it is not the 
poorest countries not the poorest segments of the population which are the most likely 
to move across national borders. Migration scholars, however, insist that —  while this 
expectation may be borne out in the long run, considering demographic transitions and 
economic transformations —  increased economic development correlates highly with 
increased international migration, expressed in concepts such as the “migration hump” 
or the “inverted U­curve” [Martin, Taylor, 1996]. As the latter term indicates, emigration 
is relatively low from regions with low or high levels of income whereas it is higher in 
those from an intermediate range. Think of countries such as Turkey or the Philippines 
which are sort of middle income countries when viewed globally and which have expe­
rienced relatively high rates of out­migration over the past decades. Nonetheless, seen 
in the long run, this is true: higher levels of economic development work to decrease 
emigration rates somewhat. Although creating jobs points to an important driver of 
migration, it is not a panacea because it does not address the underlying root causes 
of cross­border migration from the global South to the global North which consists 
of political and economic structural inequalities. It is the continued relevance of past 
and present colonialism and imperialism which are setting the stage for cross­border 
migration from the global South to the global North.
Hierarchies among Migrants: Controlling Access to Social Rights
When it comes to the European welfare states as such, there is a clear hierarchy 
between various types of migrants with respect to legally sanctioned access to social 
rights and services [Dörr, Faist, 1997; Sainsbury, 2010]. At the top tier are those mi­
grants who are now sedentary. This is so because it usually takes a while to get full 
residence and employment rights for EU citizens in other member states. The second 
tier is composed also of EU citizens in other countries but those who could be called 
circular migrants. Often, the rules regulating the transfer of contributions are complex. 
In short, this setup favours one­time migration, not repeat migration across the borders 
of EU member states. In the third tier we find non­EU citizens, that is, extracommu­
nitari who, as a rule, do not enjoy freedom of movement and have limited access to 
labour markets. Politically, this freedom has been rejected by critics to mean the free 
movement of unemployment and poverty. In the fourth and lowest tier are those who 
have no legal(ized) residence and or work status.
Also, language matters in the (re)production of hierarchies among these four migrant 
categories. The EU calls the movement of Member State citizens mobility, whereas 
those of third countries are deemed to constitute migration [Faist, 2013]. In a similar 
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way, the research literature speaks of high skilled workers of companies posting their 
employees abroad as expatriates and not as migrants.
Given this hierarchy of (non­)citizen access to social rights and services in the EU, it 
is essential to look at the underlying causes for conflicts over transnational social rights. 
Where social protection and migration are concerned, there is at present no prospect 
of harmonization of status between third­country citizens and EU citizens, because 
national welfare states are not prepared to relinquish control over their employment 
markets and social protection systems to supranational institutions.
Member states do have the ability to exercise control over individuals from third 
states, however. In this way, they use migration control and sometimes also naturaliza­
tion policies vis­à­vis third­country nationals to regulate their respective labour markets 
and, hence, working conditions, wage costs and (social) citizenship.
This is easily illustrated by the example of freedom of movement for workers. 
Argentinians of Italian descent may adopt the citizenship of their ancestors; they then 
have the option of settling not only in Italy, but in any other EU member state. Survey 
evidence on naturalization processes in Italy finds that better opportunities for moving 
to other countries was the second most chosen reason for wanting to obtain Italian 
citizenship. In these and similar cases, other member states have no control over the 
mobility of workers according to citizenship. What constitutes an employee, for exam­
ple, is increasingly defined and determined by the EU Commission. Member states do 
have the ability to exercise control over individuals from third states, however. In this 
way, they use migration control and sometimes also naturalization policies vis­à­vis 
third­country nationals to regulate their respective labour markets and, hence, working 
conditions, wage costs and (social) citizenship. Access to national citizenship thus be­
comes an indirect instrument for controlling labour markets and access to social rights.
Migration and the Rise of Populism in Europe: A Byproduct of Social Transformation
Against this economic and legal background, we have been experiencing a strong 
form of distrust and backlash against globalization, the political and economic elites, 
the EU, and we have seen the rise of populism in Europe over the last years. These 
developments can be perceived as constituting a threat to the stability and future of 
the EU, but also as an opportunity to reform the Eurozone and the European Union. 
As we have already seen, it is not economic issues which directly drive the perception 
of certain migrant categories as a threat but perceived threats to imagined cultural 
homogeneity and ways of life. Migration thus becomes culturalized in that migrants are 
also rejected because of their alleged cultural otherness. One of the most important 
contemporary expressions of culturalization and racialization in Europe has been right­
wing xenophobic populism. After all, migrants and refugees are the most visible sign of 
the second modern globalization and the concomitant social transformation [cf. Beck, 
1992]. Anti­immigration feelings among the dominant population’s electorates have 
been fostered and exploited by parties mobilising tensions related to growing inequal­
ities not only in material wealth but also power between “the elites” and “the people”.
Certainly, anti­immigrant and more broadly anti­minority populism is related not 
only to migration but also to the loss of state legitimacy and, economically, nationalist 
protectionist trade and currency policies. We should not forget that right­wing pop­
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ulism at first sight appear as a corrective to the current market liberalizing regimes in 
Europe. Yet such a view is deceiving. In reality, right­wing populists are the beneficiar­
ies of market radical, neo­liberal policies of many member state governments [Faist, 
2018a]. What is worse, right­wing populist parties such as the Front National in France, 
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy and the New 
Democrats in Sweden extend these same policies and couple them with nationalist, 
protectionist and xenophobic elements. There is no emergent left­wing populist alter­
native, except in nascent forms such as Podemos in Spain.
The Future of European Integration: New Narratives Needed
There is no counter­narrative to the right­wing populist view of the political world 
other than insisting on liberal values of democracies in Europe. Nowadays, no theory 
represents what socialism represented for the social question in the 19th and 20th 
Century. In contrast to the nineteenth century, alternative scenarios for the future seem 
to have multiplied. Socialist and communist theories —  including Marxism, anarchism, 
syndicalism —  have been complemented by, among others, postcolonial, postnational, 
feminist, and postmodern perspectives.
The pluralisation of theories help us to think of the (re)production of inequalities in 
more complex and adequate ways. In the classic version of the social question in the 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, this agent clearly was a (social) 
class —  the proletariat, in opposition to the bourgeoisie. Nowadays, even in postmodern 
approaches, the concern with inequalities but also with capitalism and democracy has 
not disappeared. Nevertheless, in order to be useful for tackling the social question of 
today which has both a vertical and horizontal dimensions, one has to decouple class 
from the previously assumed sovereignty of allegedly objective economic interests. Yet 
this needs to be done without dissolving it into identity politics or reducing it into a 
concoction of language [Eley, Nield, 2007]. In order to defend the European project and 
to include a stronger social dimension, we need to avoid both a single­minded focus 
on identity politics and policies which usually end up in “us” vs. “them” politics and a 
backward­oriented politics on class to the detriment of other heterogeneities.
Migration is a crucial lens through which to explore today’s transnationalized social 
question. While mobilization along axes such as class continues, a seminal shift toward 
cultural heterogeneities and mobilization has occurred. This has not simply led to a 
displacement of class by status and cultural politics. After all, class politics is also 
built along cultural boundaries, such as working­class culture, or bourgeois culture. 
Nonetheless, the heterogeneities that are politicized in the contemporary period have 
somewhat shifted: cultural heterogeneities now stand at the forefront of debate and 
contention. Given the finding of this analysis that class inequalities is inextricably linked 
to those around culture, one should not speak of the declining significance of class 
but rather of the increasing significance of culture and status politics.
Conclusions: Understanding the Contemporary Conflicts around Migration
In sum, market liberalization, expressed for example in the economic integration of 
the EU, serves as a basis for class distinctions among migrants, or at least reinforce 
them, while securitization plays upon class distinctions in the effort to culturalize 
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them, and constructs certain immigrant culture(s) as a threat to homogeneity and 
welfare state solidarity. Over the past few decades, the grounds for the legitimization 
of inequalities have shifted. Ascriptive traits have been complemented by the alleged 
cultural dispositions of immigrants and the conviction that immigrants as individu­
als are responsible for their own fate. Such categorizations start by distinguishing 
legitimate refugees from non­legitimate forced migrants. Another important trope is 
the alleged illiberal predispositions of migrants and their unadaptability to modernity 
[Triadafilopoulos, Adamson, Zolberg, 2011]. Bringing together market liberalization 
and culturalized securitization, the current results could be read as Max Weber’s 
Protestant Ethic reloaded (Weber 1980): politics and policies seem to reward specific 
types of migrants and refugees, exclude the low­ and non­performers in the market, 
and reward those who espouse liberal attitudes. In brief, it is a process of categorizing 
migrants into useful or dispensable.
The future of this dynamic arrangement is highly uncertain. What can be observed is 
a trend toward both a de­politicized and a politicized development of heterogeneities 
in European public spheres. As to trends toward de­politicization, multicultural group 
rights, in particular, have been contentious and criticized as divisive. What we have 
seen is a displacement of multicultural language for a semantic of diversity or even 
super­diversity in market­liberal thinking and a semantic of threat in nationalist­pop­
ulist rhetoric. Given this background, it is possible that market liberalization has also 
contributed to the decline of a rights­based approach and the rise of a resource­based 
approach. With specific regard to culture, we have seen a shift in policies from group 
rights to individual resources which can be tapped for enterprises, especially in the 
private sector. Incidentally, this has had implications for the transnational realm as 
well. For example, the World Bank has for years propagated a resource­based approach 
to link migration to development in casting migrants as development agents of their 
countries of origin through financial remittances [Faist, 2008].
While a de­politicization of cultural heterogeneities through diversity manage­
ment may help to achieve partial equalities in organizations, multicultural policies 
are strongly linked to national projects. After all, such policies are meant to foster 
national integration and the social integration of immigrants as minorities into 
national life. Nonetheless, not only social rights but also cultural rights have been 
increasingly cast by international organizations as human rights which have a 
global reach but have to be implemented by national states to become effective. 
From all we know these policies are likely to remain the chief target of securitizing 
and xenophobic efforts. While the rhetorical criticism of multiculturalism is ever 
mounting and its rhetoric is pushed back by “liberal nationalism” [Levey, 2001], 
existing multicultural policies are not reversed to the same extent. This means that 
the political struggle is on­going.
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